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ANALYSIS
Putting Traditional Values into Practice: Russia’s Anti-Gay Laws
Cai Wilkinson, Burwood.
Abstract
This article examines the rise of so-called anti-gay laws in Russia as a response to international Russian-led 
support for using “traditional values” as the foundation for human rights norms. Viewed in this way, a logic 
of moral sovereignty emerges that purports to offer a compromise between international human rights obli-
gations and local socio-cultural norms. However, in the case of anti-gay laws, moral panic over LGBTQ peo-
ple has made homophobia a political proxy for understandings of traditional values, in the process implic-
itly legitimizing homophobic violence and discrimination, and setting a dangerous precedent for traditional 
values to be invoked as a justification for violations of human rights norms.
Traditional Values at Home and Abroad
Since March 2012, Russia has been in the grip of a 
moral panic, with non-heterosexuality and gender vari-
ance portrayed as an existential threat to the country’s 
traditional values. Although not the first “anti-gay” 
law to be enacted by a municipal or regional legisla-
ture – Ryazan Oblast adopted a similar law in 2006 
and Arkhangelsk and Kostroma Oblasts followed suit 
in 2011 – the passing of a law prohibiting “homosex-
ual propaganda” amongst minors by the St Petersburg 
Duma marked the start of the demonization of lesbian, 
gay, bisexual, transgender and queer (LGBTQ) peo-
ple in Russia due to their supposedly deviant sexual-
ity and the danger it posed to the moral health of the 
nation’s children. Reflecting the growing intensity of 
the panic sparked by the St Petersburg anti-homopropa-
ganda law, a further six regional administrations subse-
quently passed similar laws, and in June 2013 a federal 
law was passed outlawing the “propaganda of non-tra-
ditional sexual relations to minors”.
While international criticism of these laws has 
focused on fact that they are, by prevailing interna-
tional human rights norms, a violation of LGBTQ 
people’s human rights, the wording of the federal law 
hints at the fact that the recent spate of anti-gay legisla-
tion is part of a broader shift by the Kremlin to extend 
the notion of sovereign democracy into the realm of 
human rights norms and challenge attempts by actors 
such as the US, EU and United Nations to argue that 
LGBT rights are human rights. Both domestically and 
in international fora, Russia has framed its rejection 
of LGBT rights as being about the protection of tra-
ditional values and the need to respect local cultures. 
Its membership of the UN Human Rights Council 
between 2009 and 2012 provided it with a platform 
from which to make its case, and Russia made full 
use of the opportunity, successfully sponsoring three 
resolutions over its term in office that sought to legit-
imize “traditional values of mankind” as the basis for 
human rights norms.
The final of the three resolutions, which was contro-
versially adopted in September 2012 by a vote of 25–15 
with seven abstentions, asserted “that traditional val-
ues, especially those shared by all humanity, can be 
practically applied in the promotion and protection 
of human rights and upholding human dignity” and 
called on states to strengthen “the important role of fam-
ily, community, society and educational institutions in 
upholding and transmitting these values” via “appropri-
ate positive measures” (A/HRC/21/L.2). As with previ-
ous documentation linked to the resolutions, traditional 
values were defined as “dignity, freedom and responsibil-
ity”, with equality conspicuously absent. The resolution 
concluded by requesting that the Office of the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights “collect information 
[…] on best practices in the application of traditional 
values while promoting and protecting human rights”.
The Logic of Moral Sovereignty: Prohibiting 
the Sin, Not the Sinner
Viewed against this backdrop, it is perhaps less surpris-
ing that anti-homopropaganda laws have enjoyed strong 
backing from the Kremlin. To many Russians, such laws 
offer a “best practice” solution to seemingly intracta-
ble tensions between the maintenance of moral values 
and the push to explicitly recognize the human rights 
of LGBTQ people on the grounds of non-discrimina-
tion. As a number of Russian officials including Presi-
dent Putin have sought to explain, this is achieved using 
a logic of prohibiting the sin, but not the sinner: being 
lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender or queer is not banned 
and LGBT citizens enjoy all the same rights and pro-
tections as heterosexual citizens, provided they do not 
transgress societal norms in public.
However, as well as being highly problematic on a 
practical level, acceptance of such an argument essen-
tially reframes human rights norms and the state’s role 
in their maintenance. Firstly, the enjoyment of human 
rights is made contingent on the individual’s behaviour 
and conformity with dominant societal values, rather 
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than being fundamental for all human being regardless 
of one’s identity and resultant moral, social or political 
status. Secondly, rather than being responsible for ensur-
ing the observance of the principle of non-discrimina-
tion for all its citizens, the state’s role is now to police its 
citizens’ behaviour and ensure compliance with estab-
lished moral values, with those failing or refusing to con-
form to the stipulated standards subject to both societal 
and legal sanctions.
The combined effect is to fatally undermine the 
notion of universal fundamental human rights, with 
stigmatization and subsequent discrimination – the very 
phenomena that universal human rights norms were 
designed to combat – now becoming institutionalized 
as the basis for a regime of moral regulation that seeks 
to protect the interests of the majority by suppressing 
the rights of the minority. Yet rather than seeing this 
dynamic as being at odds with contemporary norms of 
sovereignty, which require states to protect the rights of 
all citizens, Russia has cast the adoption of anti-homo-
propaganda laws as necessary to maintain the country’s 
“moral sovereignty”, which is perceived to be under attack 
from LGBTQ people and their supporters.
Homophobia as a Proxy for Traditional 
Values
By portraying the human rights claims of LGBTQ peo-
ple as an existential threat not only to morality but also 
Russia’s sovereignty and, by extension, national identity, 
proponents of the laws have been able to make political 
homophobia a central feature of an increasingly intol-
erant and populist regime of moral regulation. Central 
to this undertaking has been the stimulation of moral 
panic over homosexuality as a source of societal corrup-
tion, which has capitalized on the wider fears and anx-
ieties of the Russian population about the future in the 
face of perceived demographic decline, concerns about 
living standards and the country’s post-Cold War loss 
of status. Within this narrative, the normalization of 
homosexuality has been portrayed as the antithesis of 
Russia’s traditional values as an Orthodox Christian and 
non-Western civilization.
As such, therefore, homophobia functions as a Slavo-
phile political shorthand for national identity and tra-
ditional values. This discourse has frequently been evi-
dent in justifications of the necessity of anti-gay laws put 
forward by proponents of such legislation. The initia-
tor of the St Petersburg law, Vitaly Milonov, for exam-
ple, explained in an interview with The St. Petersburg 
Times in March 20121 that his objection to gay parades 
is because he is “an Orthodox Christian and the dem-
1 <http://sptimes.ru/index.php?action_id=100&story_id=35381>
onstration of the sin of Sodom is repellent to me”, and 
went on to illustrate the need to protect Russian chil-
dren from depraved homosexuals with a vivid anecdote 
about having seen “photographs where men with all sorts 
of dildos are running around semi-naked” in Berlin. In 
case this vision of public debauchery was insufficient to 
persuade people of the righteousness of his cause, Milo-
nov went on to dismiss international criticism of the law 
as a violation of human rights obligations as the work 
of an international gay lobby that has infiltrated the 
UN and the European Council, arguing that “this is 
Europe’s problem; why should we copy European laws? 
Not everything that they have in Europe is acceptable 
for Russia”. The implicit message is clear: to be prop-
erly Russian is to be Orthodox Christian and against 
homosexuality.
Similarly, while the wording of the federal bill passed 
in June did not explicitly mention homosexuality, the 
law’s backers have made it clear that this is what is pri-
marily meant by “non-traditional sexual relations”. Sig-
nificantly the revised phrasing highlights how homopho-
bia is serving a shorthand articulation of what traditional 
values actually are, and why they are needed. During a 
TV interview with Vladimir Posner in February 2013,2 
Deputy Elena Mizulina, co-author of the federal law 
and head of the Committee on Women, Children and 
Families, explained that in order to solve Russia’s demo-
graphic crisis, “we must tighten up certain moral values 
and information […]. This is vital for the birth rate to 
rise, and for child-rearing to be fully valued”. Accord-
ing to such thinking, LGBTQ people are Russian soci-
ety’s very own folk devils, their public presence a sign of 
everything that is wrong both in Russia and elsewhere, 
from falling birth rates to rising secularism and the ques-
tioning of the government’s legitimacy.
Aided by overwhelmingly negative media portrayals 
of LGBTQ people and the Russian Orthodox Church’s 
hardline condemnation of homosexuality, this argu-
ment has found significant resonance with the wider 
public, and Russia’s government and its supporters has 
been happy to capitalize on it to shore up their position. 
In the absence of positive and non-sensationalist infor-
mation about human sexuality and gender, and with 
86% of Russians believing that they have never met an 
LGBTQ person and viewing it as something inherently 
alien to Russia, the construction of homosexuality as the 
“other” of traditional values and resultant broad support 
for greater moral regulation has been driven by fear of 
the unfamiliar and wider societal anxieties, with little 
thought for the practical consequences and human costs.
2 <http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2134590>
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Moral Regulation in Practice: Legitimating 
Homophobia
Despite the official position that the aim is to eliminate 
the influence of the sin and not to discriminate against 
the sinner, there is growing evidence that Russia’s anti-
gay laws are serving to legitimate homophobic discrimi-
nation and violence, with frequently devastating conse-
quences for those who transgress or even dare to question 
the new moral regime. At its most violent, popular moral 
regulation has taken the form of hate crimes against men 
who are, or who are suspected of being gay, such as the 
brutal rape and murder of 23-year old Vladislav Tor-
novoi in Volgograd, who was beaten, sodomised with 
three beer bottles before his assailants smashed his head 
in with a 20kg rock lest he survive and identify them, 
and the murder of 38-year old Oleg Serdyuk in Kam-
chatka, who was stabbed and trampled to death for 
being gay. Arguably no less brutal have been the rise 
of far right movements such as Occupy Pedophilia and 
Occupy Gerontophilia that ‘hunt’ for gay men and teen-
agers online, often via dating websites, and then kid-
nap and abuse them in order to ‘cure’ their deviant sex-
uality, posting videos of their victims’ ordeals on social 
media sites as a deterrent to others.
A further tactic that, while not involving physical 
violence, has been utilized no less effectively for convey-
ing the message that homosexuality is unacceptable and 
will not be tolerated in the public sphere has been the 
dismissal, or attempted dismissal, of LGBTQ people or 
their supporters from their places of work. In May this 
year journalist Anton Krasovsky was fired after having 
come out on air and declaring “I am gay, and I am a 
human being just like Putin and Medvedev”, and fellow 
journalist Oleg Dusaev, who came out on Facebook at 
the end of August, found his contract with TV chan-
nel Kultura unexpectedly and immediately terminated. 
Several school teachers have also found themselves either 
fired or pressured to resign due to their “non-traditional” 
sexuality becoming known, and participation in a pro-
test against the first reading of the federal anti-gay bill 
outside the State Duma in Moscow in January almost 
ended in the dismissal of state lycée biology teacher Ilya 
Kolmanovsky after anonymous complaints were made 
to the school.
One group that has to all intents and purposes been 
erased by the adoption of anti-gay laws are LGBTQ 
minors. As in other countries, LGBTQ youth are par-
ticularly vulnerable to bullying and victimization, and 
the introduction of legislation has further marginalized 
and isolated them not only by increasing stigmatization 
but also by putting any adults willing to support them 
at risk of prosecution. The online project “Children 404” 
(a play on the 404 error message that appears when an 
internet page isn’t found) on Facebook3 and VKontakte4 
provides an outlet for LGBTQ youth to share their sto-
ries, providing both solidarity and a direct rebuttal to 
those who maintain that forbidding talk of non-tradi-
tional sexual relations will ensure that people will be het-
erosexual. As sixteen year old Yegor commented in his 
post, “You know, being gay is not a desire that we chil-
dren choose. Indeed, it’s not a desire at all”.
Conclusion: Putting Sexual Citizenship 
Back in the Closet
With the exception of a small number of LGBTQ activ-
ists, even before the advent of Russia’s anti-gays laws 
being “out” about one’s sexuality was very much the 
exception rather than the norm. The introduction of leg-
islation seeking to keep LGBTQ people firmly behind 
a closed and policed closet door, however, marks an 
attempt by Russia to actively exclude sexuality from 
norms of human rights norms and, by extension, citi-
zenship. While this move is internally coherent, repre-
senting the operationalization of traditional values as 
a basis for human rights, in practice it sets a danger-
ous precedent for the denial of the rights of citizenship 
to any group at odds with traditional values, as well as 
encouraging the use of moral vigilantism to censure 
dissent of any kind.
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